feat: Phase 2 security audit fixes + script execution platform
Security (P0/P1/P2):
- WebSSH: dedicated short-lived token, server_id binding, 4003 close code
- Remove /api/agent/exec from control plane (RCE surface eliminated)
- Global JWT middleware (JwtAuthMiddleware) with install-mode bypass
- decrypt_value: failure returns None, never leaks ciphertext
- Telegram: sanitize_external_message strips sensitive fields
- Agent auth: startup enforces non-empty API key, compare_digest
- Credentials: password_set bool flag, no plaintext in API responses
- audit_log: writes admin_username + ip_address on all CUD ops
- Install lock: all /api/install/* except GET /status return 403 post-install
- WebSocket dedup: publish once, subscribers deliver locally
Script execution platform:
- script_jobs.py / script_job_callback.py: async batching and callback
- script_execution_store.py / script_callback_rate.py: Redis-backed state
- script_execution_flush.py: background flusher to MySQL
- scripts.html / script-executions.html: full execution UI
- agent_url.py: centralised URL builder
Frontend:
- All 13 pages migrated from CDN to /app/vendor/ (no external deps)
- vendor/: alpinejs, tailwindcss-browser, xterm, xterm-addon-*, qrious
- Dashboard WebSocket real-time alerts; 8h JWT session timeout
Tests:
- test_security_unit.py: 15 unit tests (JWT, sanitize, vendor, install 403)
- test_api.py: env-configurable admin credentials
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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