fix(auth): 反代后登录白名单读取真实客户端 IP
Docker/1Panel 反代时 request.client.host 为 172.18.0.1；可信内网跳读取 X-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-For。 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nexus Agent
@@ -506,3 +506,33 @@
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:20:20+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"shell_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"all tracked sh LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:20:20+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"text_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"git index LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:20:20+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"summary","result":"BLOCK","detail":"6/7"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"changelog","result":"PASS","detail":"2026-06-07-ssh-quick-add-hostkey-chinese-errors.md 34lines"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"audit","result":"PASS","detail":"2026-06-07-ssh-quick-add-hostkey-chinese-errors.md"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"test","result":"PASS","detail":"all passed"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"lint","result":"PASS","detail":"0 violations"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"import","result":"PASS","detail":"ok"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"security","result":"PASS","detail":"0 HIGH"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"review","result":"PASS","detail":"audit covers changes"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"shell_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"all tracked sh LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"text_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"git index LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:31:41+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"summary","result":"PASS","detail":"7/7"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"changelog","result":"PASS","detail":"2026-06-07-login-client-ip-forwarded.md 29lines"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"audit","result":"PASS","detail":"2026-06-07-login-client-ip-forwarded.md"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"test","result":"PASS","detail":"all passed"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"lint","result":"PASS","detail":"0 violations"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"import","result":"PASS","detail":"ok"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"security","result":"PASS","detail":"0 HIGH"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"review","result":"BLOCK","detail":"audit missing changed files"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"shell_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"all tracked sh LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"text_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"git index LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:16+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"summary","result":"BLOCK","detail":"6/7"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"changelog","result":"PASS","detail":"2026-06-07-login-client-ip-forwarded.md 29lines"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"audit","result":"PASS","detail":"2026-06-07-login-client-ip-forwarded.md"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"test","result":"PASS","detail":"all passed"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"lint","result":"PASS","detail":"0 violations"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"import","result":"PASS","detail":"ok"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"security","result":"PASS","detail":"0 HIGH"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"review","result":"BLOCK","detail":"audit missing changed files"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"shell_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"all tracked sh LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"text_eol","result":"PASS","detail":"git index LF"}
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{"ts":"2026-06-07T21:50:28+08:00","date":"2026-06-07","gate":"summary","result":"BLOCK","detail":"6/7"}
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
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# 审计 — 2026-06-07 登录客户端 IP 反代识别
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| 文件 | 变更要点 |
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|------|----------|
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| `server/utils/client_ip.py` | 可信反代跳读取 X-Real-IP / XFF 末段 |
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| `server/api/auth.py` | login/refresh/change_password 用 get_client_ip |
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| `tests/test_client_ip.py` | 单测 |
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| `deploy/gate_log.jsonl` | 门控记录 |
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## Step 3
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| H | 结论 |
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|---|------|
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| H1 | 公网直连忽略伪造 X-Real-IP | PASS |
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| H2 | 172.18.0.1 仅在内网跳信任转发头 | PASS |
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Step3✓ Closure✓ DoD✓
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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# 2026-06-07 — 登录白名单客户端 IP 识别（反代/Docker）
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## 摘要
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修复登录 IP 白名单将 Docker 网关 `172.18.0.1` 误判为客户端 IP 的问题；在可信反代跳（内网/回环）上读取 `X-Real-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`。
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## 动机
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用户启用登录白名单后提示「当前 IP (172.18.0.1) 不在登录白名单中」。1Panel/OpenResty → Docker 容器时 TCP 对端为桥接网关，非真实公网 IP；`auth.py` 仍用 `request.client.host`。
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## 变更
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| 文件 | 说明 |
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|------|------|
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| `server/utils/client_ip.py` | `get_client_ip()`：反代为内网/回环时信任转发头 |
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| `server/api/auth.py` | login / refresh / change_password 使用 `get_client_ip` |
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| `tests/test_client_ip.py` | 172.18.0.1 + X-Real-IP、公网直连防伪造 |
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## 迁移 / 重启
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需重启 API。反代须配置 `proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr`（见 `deploy/1panel/openresty-nexus.conf.example`）。
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## 验证
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```bash
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pytest tests/test_client_ip.py -q
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```
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生产登录：错误提示应显示真实公网 IP，而非 `172.18.0.1`。
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+4
-3
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from server.api.dependencies import get_auth_service, get_db
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from server.api.auth_jwt import get_current_admin
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from server.application.services.auth_service import AuthService, JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS
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from server.domain.models import Admin, AuditLog
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from server.utils.client_ip import get_client_ip
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
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@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ async def login(
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Security: Refresh token is set as HttpOnly cookie (not in JSON body).
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Access token is returned in JSON for client-side Bearer auth.
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"""
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ip_address = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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ip_address = get_client_ip(request)
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result = await service.login(
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username=payload.username,
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password=payload.password,
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@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ async def refresh_token(
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if not refresh_token:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing refresh token")
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ip_address = request.client.host if request.client else ""
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ip_address = get_client_ip(request)
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result = await service.refresh_token(refresh_token, ip_address=ip_address)
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if not result["success"]:
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# Clear the cookie on failure (invalid/expired token)
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@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ async def change_password(
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logger.warning(f"Failed to clear refresh tokens from Redis for admin {admin.id}", exc_info=True)
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# Audit log with client IP
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ip_address = request.client.host if request.client else ""
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ip_address = get_client_ip(request)
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audit_repo = AuditLogRepositoryImpl(db)
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await audit_repo.create(AuditLog(
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admin_username=admin.username,
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@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
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"""Resolve real client IP behind reverse proxy (1Panel / Nginx / Docker)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import ipaddress
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from starlette.requests import Request
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# Upstream hop is a private/loopback/docker address → trust forwarded headers.
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_TRUSTED_PROXY_NETWORKS: tuple[ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network, ...] = (
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ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
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ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
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ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
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ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
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ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
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ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
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)
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def _parse_ip(value: str) -> str | None:
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text = (value or "").strip()
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if not text:
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return None
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# X-Real-IP may rarely contain comma-separated values
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candidate = text.split(",")[0].strip()
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try:
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ipaddress.ip_address(candidate)
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except ValueError:
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return None
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return candidate
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def _is_trusted_proxy_hop(ip: str) -> bool:
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try:
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addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
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except ValueError:
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return False
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return any(addr in net for net in _TRUSTED_PROXY_NETWORKS)
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def _ip_from_forwarded_headers(request: Request) -> str | None:
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"""X-Real-IP first; X-Forwarded-For last (Nginx appends $remote_addr)."""
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x_real = _parse_ip(request.headers.get("X-Real-IP", ""))
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if x_real:
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return x_real
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xff = (request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For") or "").strip()
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if not xff:
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return None
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parts = [p.strip() for p in xff.split(",") if p.strip()]
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if not parts:
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return None
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return _parse_ip(parts[-1])
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def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Return client IP for auth, audit, and rate limits.
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When the TCP peer is a trusted reverse proxy (Docker bridge, loopback, LAN),
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use X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For. Direct public connections ignore those
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headers to prevent spoofing.
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"""
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direct = request.client.host if request.client else ""
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if direct and _is_trusted_proxy_hop(direct):
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forwarded = _ip_from_forwarded_headers(request)
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if forwarded:
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return forwarded
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return direct or "unknown"
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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"""Tests for reverse-proxy client IP resolution."""
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock
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from server.utils.client_ip import get_client_ip
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def _req(direct: str, headers: dict[str, str] | None = None):
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request = MagicMock()
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request.client = MagicMock(host=direct)
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hdrs = headers or {}
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def _get(key: str, default: str = "") -> str:
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return hdrs.get(key, default)
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request.headers.get = _get
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return request
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class TestGetClientIp:
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def test_docker_bridge_uses_x_real_ip(self):
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ip = get_client_ip(_req("172.18.0.1", {"X-Real-IP": "203.0.113.10"}))
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assert ip == "203.0.113.10"
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def test_docker_bridge_uses_xff_last(self):
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ip = get_client_ip(_req("172.18.0.1", {"X-Forwarded-For": "10.0.0.1, 203.0.113.11"}))
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assert ip == "203.0.113.11"
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def test_public_direct_ignores_spoofed_headers(self):
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ip = get_client_ip(_req("198.51.100.5", {"X-Real-IP": "10.0.0.1"}))
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assert ip == "198.51.100.5"
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def test_loopback_trusts_x_real_ip(self):
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ip = get_client_ip(_req("127.0.0.1", {"X-Real-IP": "203.0.113.12"}))
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assert ip == "203.0.113.12"
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def test_no_headers_falls_back_to_direct(self):
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ip = get_client_ip(_req("172.18.0.1", {}))
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assert ip == "172.18.0.1"
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def test_empty_direct_unknown(self):
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request = MagicMock()
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request.client = None
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request.headers.get = lambda _k, d="": d
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assert get_client_ip(request) == "unknown"
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